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MED-ARB ADOPTION IN SECURITIES LAW DISPUTES:
ADVANTAGES AND COSTS
Hyung Kyun Kwon*
This Article considers the adoption of a hybrid method of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR)—Med-Arb—in securities law disputes. Because
securities law ADR is currently monopolized by claims that proceed through
arbitration, this Article argues that the benefits of settling a claim through
mediation are being lost. Med-Arb allows parties to access the benefits of
both mediation and arbitration with potentially lower economic costs and the
assurance of finality of the dispute. This Article therefore presents how best
to use Med-Arb to successfully resolve securities law disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1925, congestion in the court system and increasing litigation costs
led the United States Congress to pass the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1
Since then, the legal industry has frequently used arbitration, a form of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), to resolve legal disputes in the United
States.2
With its simple and cost-efficient features, arbitration soon became
the norm for ADR in many legal disputes, such as labor and employment
conflicts. 3 Securities traders innately crave cost savings and are naturally
drawn to arbitration because of its efficiency. In an effort to steer dispute
resolution toward arbitration, securities traders increasingly used mandatory
arbitration clauses in investment contracts, and the Supreme Court of the
United States approved the use of these clauses in 1987. 4 Since then,
mandatory arbitration has been the primary ADR device used to resolve
securities law disputes.5
However, arbitration is not the only ADR method available for
securities disputes. In addition to arbitration, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) also allows the use of mediation in securities disputes.6
Despite the presence of this alternative option—mediation—the vast majority
of cases are resolved through arbitration.7 In 2015, roughly 99% of securities
1

See Zachary E. Davison, Minding the Gap: A Call for Standardizing Pre-dispute
Arbitration Clauses in OTC Derivative Transactions, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 707, 714
(2015).
2
Id. at 716.
3
See Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the
Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 20 n.94 (2014).
4
In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court initially outlawed use of mandatory arbitration
provisions in securities contracts as a result of the non-waiver provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933, viewing arbitration as inadequate to protect investors’ rights. 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953). However, in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court upheld the use of
mandatory provisions, holding that Wilko did not apply to claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight
authority protects the parties’ substantive rights. 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); Davison, supra
note 1, at 715–16.
5
Davison, supra note 1, at 715–16.
6
See Overview, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation /overview (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (referring to the Overview of Arbitration &
Mediation portion of the site).
7
See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www
.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics#mediationstats (last visited
Mar. 4, 2017).
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cases were filed with arbitration clauses, and only 9% of the cases were
resolved in mediation.8 Despite arbitration’s efficiency and credibility, the
overwhelming preference for arbitration is undesirable because in some cases
mediation can be more effective than arbitration.
This Article suggests the adoption of an alternative, hybrid method of
the two existing systems, called Med-Arb, as a prospective solution that can
help improve the efficiency of ADR in the securities context. As the title
directly reflects, Med-Arb combines features of mediation and arbitration9
and is composed of two separate phases that mimic mediation and arbitration
respectively. In Med-Arb, mediation and arbitration happen in the same place
and time—this reduces costs and promotes an efficient resolution of the
dispute. 10 Med-Arb reduces overall ADR costs because it appropriately
encourages the increased use of mediation (instead of arbitration) in the
resolution of disputes.
To analyze and evaluate Med-Arb’s applicability to resolving
securities law disputes, this Article will present a three-part analysis. First,
this Article examines the current ADR structure of securities law disputes and
assesses the problems of the current system. It then introduces and analyzes
the elements and characteristics of the Med-Arb approach and evaluates its
strengths and weaknesses. Next, this Article presents a framework for how
Med-Arb can be used effectively to resolve securities law disputes, arguing
that the benefits of the supervised use of the Med-Arb approach ultimately
outweigh its costs.
I. OVERVIEW OF ADR IN SECURITIES LAW DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES
Since the Supreme Court approved the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses in investor contracts for securities in the Shearson/American Express
v. McMahon11 decision in 1987, ADR has become the most common practice
for resolving securities disputes.12 Most modern investment contracts include
arbitration provisions, mediation provisions, or both. 13 Accordingly, most
8

See id.
John T. Blankenship, Developing Your ADR Attitude Med-Arb: A Template for
Adaptive ADR, 42 TENN. B.J. 28, 28 (2006).
10
Id.
11
482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
12
Davison, supra note 1, at 716; see also Byron Crowe II, Financial Services ADR:
What the United States Could Learn from South Africa, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 145, 152
(2014).
13
See Crowe II, supra note 12, at 146.
9

2017

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

47

securities disputes are settled using these ADR methods, 14 with most
proceeding through arbitration.15 This section will introduce a brief historical
background of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) dispute
resolution; explain the structural features of FINRA arbitration and
mediation; and examine the inherent problems of the existing system.
A.

Historical and Institutional Background of Governance

The seemingly straightforward structure of ADR in securities law
disputes began in 1933 when Congress increased efforts to regulate financial
markets.16 After the disastrous experience of the Great Depression, Congress
realized that the securities market needed an authoritative and resourceful
monitoring institution to govern securities matters and prevent another
financial disaster.17 As a result, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in an effort to restore confidence in
U.S. capital markets.18 Notably, with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Congress delegated power to regulate securities to a new agency—the SEC.19
Entrusted with this newly granted authority, the SEC became the sole
regulatory body responsible for governing and monitoring participants in the
securities markets.20 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires all traders
to register with the SEC.21 Once registered with the SEC, traders are bound
to comply with SEC rules and regulations.22
After several years, however, Congress realized that the SEC might
need help regulating securities markets. 23 Thus, Congress passed an
additional law—the Maloney Act—that formed a group of non-governmental
institutions, called self-regulatory organizations (SROs), to assist with SEC
operations.24 The SROs alleviate some of the SEC’s administrative burden

14

See id. at 160; see also Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7.
See id.
16
See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about
/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
Crowe II, supra note 12, at 150.
21
Id. at 150–51.
22
See id. at 151.
23
See id.
24
Id.
15
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by helping regulate broker-dealers and their representatives. 25 While
technically the SEC delegates this authority to the SROs, 26 the SEC still
retains control over broker-dealers because the Maloney Act mandates that
SROs register with, and be authorized by, the SEC.27 Thus, broker-dealers
remain under incidental control of the SEC, as the SEC directly controls the
SROs, which hold regulatory authority over the broker-dealers and their
representatives. 28 Originally, there were several SROs governing different
types of broker-dealers,29 but in 2003 all of the functions were unified under
a single flagship, FINRA.30 Currently, FINRA is the only SRO that supports
SEC governance for broker-dealers and their representatives.31
B.

FINRA Dispute Resolutions

In addition to handling administrative duties that assist the SEC’s
securities governance, FINRA also performs another critical function:
providing an official tribunal for securities law dispute resolution.32 As the
SEC’s only SRO, FINRA is the primary direct supervisor of securities law
dispute resolution.33
Even though ADR has been available since 1817 when the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) held its first internal arbitration, 34 ADR did not
become the primary method for securities dispute resolution until the
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of securities law arbitration in 1987.35
Before this time, customer disputes normally went through litigation
proceedings because the Court had been reluctant to approve pre-dispute
ADR agreements for securities disputes due to the informal nature of ADR.36
25

See id.
See id. (regarding SROs making rules subject to the approval of the SEC).
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 336–38 (2006).
30
See generally What We Do, supra note 16.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
Gross, supra note 29, at 336–37.
35
There is no clear reason why ADR was not commonly used even though traders and
investors could have chosen ADR after the dispute arose. The participants may have been
reluctant to choose ADR to resolve their conflicts because they thought it might not be
appropriate based on the Wilko ruling. See id.
36
See id.
26
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Over time, the Court’s thinking on the subject evolved, culminating in its
opinion in Shearson/American Express in 1987.37 In that case, the Court held
that claims under the Securities Exchange Act could be resolved using
arbitration if an arbitration agreement had been executed prior to the
beginning of the dispute. 38 In return, any such ADR process had to be
conducted or monitored by an SRO under SEC control. 39 After
Shearson/American Express, then-existing SROs, like the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the NYSE, started to build
dispute resolution departments. All of these SROs were unified under
FINRA’s ADR department in 2007,40 and FINRA presently conducts 99% of
securities law disputes using ADR.41
Securities law disputes filed with FINRA generally arise in two
forms: customer or industry claims.42 Customer claims fall into six different
categories: (1) misrepresentation and omission, (2) market manipulation, (3)
price predictions and guarantees, (4) churning, (5) breach of fiduciary duties,
and (6) failure of service claims. 43 Industry claims fall into four different
categories: (1) collection claims, (2) Central Registration Depository issues,
(3) clearing disputes, and (4) employment claims.44 Regardless of the type of
claim, most disputes will be between a customer and a broker-dealer firm or
between an employed broker and a hiring broker-dealer firm.45 Structured
governance is key to fair and reasonable ADR proceedings because parties to
a dispute often bring disparate legal and financial resources to the negotiation.
Essentially, FINRA tries to level the playing field between broker-dealer
firms and individual parties that have relatively limited resources.46

37
See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(demonstrating the Court’s endorsement of the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and
that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 indicates a federal policy favoring the use of
arbitration in general).
38
Id. at 242.
39
See Gross, supra note 29, at 336–37.
40
Ernest Edward Badway & Matthew S. Adams, The Alternative Dispute Resolution
Process in the United States Securities Industry: A Primer, 24 J. TAX’N & REG. FIN.
INSTITUTIONS 31, 33 (2011).
41
Crowe II, supra note 12, at 146.
42
Badway & Adams, supra note 40, at 43.
43
See id. at 43–47.
44
See id. at 48–51.
45
See id. at 43–51.
46
See id.
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FINRA Arbitration

FINRA manages securities law arbitration through the procedural
rules set forth in the FINRA Manual.47 FINRA’s definition of arbitration does
not differ much from most state and federal definitions of arbitration: namely,
arbitration is a method of dispute resolution that results in a final
determination that binds the parties.48
FINRA arbitration generally follows the pattern set forth in
Shearson/American Express.49 Once parties sign an investment contract that
includes an arbitration agreement, they are required to use arbitration when
settling any conflicts arising out of the execution of that contract. 50 The
parties are technically free to agree on where to conduct the arbitration, but
most parties agree to arbitrate at FINRA, where all broker-dealers are
registered.51 As a result, the FINRA Manual provides the governing standards
used in securities arbitration.52
In doing so, the FINRA Manual articulates separate guidelines for
customer and industry arbitration. 53 The two standards contain procedural
rules that are nearly identical except for the eligibility requirement provisions
for arbitrating cases.54 The rules governing customer arbitrations state that
47
See 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY
AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403
&record_id=5174&element_id =4096&highlight=12000#r5174 (last visited Feb. Mar, 4
2017); see also 13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY
AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403
&record_id=5272&element_id=4193&highlight=13000#r5272 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
48
See Gross, supra note 29, at 350–51; see also 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure
for Customer Disputes, supra note 47.
49
See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(requiring arbitration to settle a conflict when parties have signed an investment contract
with an arbitration agreement).
50
See Davison, supra note 1, at 716.
51
See Standards for Admission, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org
/industry/standards-admission (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (regarding registration
requirements for broker-dealers with FINRA).
52
Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
101, 105 (2014).
53
12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra note 47; 13000.
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note 47.
54
See 12200. Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of NASD, FIN.
INDUS.
REGULATORY
AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html
?rbid=2403&record_id= 11006&element_id=7944&highlight=12200#r11006 (last visited
Mar. 4, 2017); 12201. Elective Arbitration, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11007&element
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the arbitration agreement must be included in the investment contract in order
to bind the customer.55 Since all broker-dealers must register with FINRA
and all conflicts involving broker-dealers registered with FINRA must be
held there, the rules essentially mandate that all customer arbitration be held
at FINRA. 56 Likewise, the rules for industry arbitration require registered
firms to resolve industry conflicts at FINRA.57
To receive an enforceable arbitration award, parties must comply with
the FINRA Manual’s procedural rules.58 Otherwise, the opposing party can
file a motion to dismiss the suit—running the risk that the arbitrator might
accept the motion and dismiss the claim. 59 FINRA regulates arbitrator
selection, 60 procedural conduct requirements for the parties, and
_id=7945&highlight=12201#r11007 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12202. Claims Against
Inactive Members, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display
/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11008&element_id=7946&highlight=12202#r11008
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12203. Denial of NASD Forum, http://finra.complinet.com/en
/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11009&element_id=7947&highlight=12203#
r11009 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); see also 13200. Required Arbitration, FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&
record_id=11105&element_id=8043&highlight=13200#r11105 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017);
13201. Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11106&element
_id=8044&highlight=13201#r11106 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13202. Claims Involving
Registered Clearing Agencies, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com
/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11107&element_id=8045&highlight=1320
2#r11107 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13203. Denial of NASD Forum, FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&
record_id=11108&element_id=8046&highlight=13203#r11108 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
55
12200. Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of NASD, supra note
54.
56
12208. Representation of Parties, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11014&element_id=7952&
highlight=12208#r11014 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
57
13208. Representation of Parties, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11113&element_id=8051&
highlight=13208#r11113 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
58
See generally 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra
note 47; see also 13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note
47.
59
12503. Motions, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com
/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11057&element_id=7995&highlight=1250
3#r11057 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13503. Motions, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11156&element
_id=8094&highlight=13503#r11156 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
60
12401. Number of Arbitrators, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11039&element_id=7977&
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qualifications for necessary statements.61 The rules cover these matters in a
fairly exacting fashion; thus, satisfying the given standards may require the
assistance of attorneys or other representatives with sophisticated legal
knowledge.
Despite the level of complexity in this system, arbitration’s
competitive advantage lies in its economic and procedural efficiency.
Securities trading parties are likely to turn to litigation in federal court if
arbitration is impossible. Binding arbitration that complies with the Supreme
Court’s existing standard can be somewhat complex but nowhere near as
complex as full-scale federal litigation.62 Federal litigation invariably takes
far more time and resources than a FINRA-supervised arbitration. For
example, in litigation, the parties must consider a wide gamut of procedural
issues unrelated to the substance of the underlying dispute itself. Further,
parties must comply with demanding court filing deadlines and any unique
legal customs and rules applicable in the jurisdiction.
In contrast, when parties use FINRA’s uniform standard for securities
arbitration, there is no need to worry about additional procedural issues—
instead, the parties can focus on resolving the substantive legal issue being
disputed. Arbitration also has the advantages of finality and flexibility. 63
Moreover, FINRA arbitration is attractive to parties that want to protect
private information because its confidentiality requirements are more
extensive than those in litigation—usually the only thing disclosed at the end
of arbitration is the outcome of the proceeding.64
D.

FINRA Mediation

FINRA also allows for the more informal ADR method of mediation,
which differs from arbitration in many respects. While arbitration results in a
binding decision based on an arbitrator’s legal analysis, mediation does not
highlight=12401#r11039 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13401. Number of Arbitrators, FIN.
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403
&record_id=11138&element_id=8076&highlight=13401#r11138 (last visited Mar. 4,
2017).
61
See generally 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra
note 47; see also 13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note
47.
62
See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232–33 (1987).
63
See Gross, supra note 29, at 357–59.
64
See id.
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provide a legally binding result, because mediators do not have any authority
to issue a binding legal judgment. Mediation, completed in an informal
setting, is designed to provide a mutually beneficial solution for all parties to
the dispute. Thus, unlike arbitrators acting as active decision makers,
mediators facilitate voluntary settlements.65 Moreover, while arbitration uses
litigious hearings attended by both parties, mediation uses a series of private,
ex parte meetings called caucuses. 66 In mediation, the mediator interacts
separately with each party and hears the differing opinions in private
settings.67 The information obtained from these meetings allows the mediator
to pinpoint the issues on which the parties may compromise—enabling the
mediator to efficiently soothe the conflict.68 Because information from these
meetings could adversely impact the parties in the event of a lawsuit, all
information uncovered during the course of mediation is confidential.69 This
level of confidentiality is higher than in arbitration, 70 and arbitration or
litigation awards may be repealed when they are rendered based on
information from mediation procedures.71
Mediation is a much simpler and cheaper alternative to arbitration.72
Parties in mediation are likely to encounter even fewer procedural rules than
are found in arbitration hearings. As previously noted, arbitration employs
procedural rules that are simpler than traditional court rules; mediation
simplifies the procedural picture even further. While arbitration must use
pleading-like procedures to maintain legitimacy, as a tribunal rendering a
decision according to rule of law, mediation needs no such procedures
because it is nothing more than a settlement assistance process. Mediation
provides a catalyst for parties to negotiate a settlement without the help of a
binding decision-maker, thus saving money. This is not to say that mediation

65

See Initiate an Arbitration or Mediation, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://
www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/initiate (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
66
See Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the
Same Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L.
REV. 317, 334 (2011).
67
Id.
68
See id.
69
Id.
70
See id. at 336.
71
See id. at 346.
72
Comparison Between Arbitration & Mediation, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/comparison-between-arbitration-mediation
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
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is not governed by procedural rules; the Supreme Court mandates some
procedural protection for parties involved in mediation.73 FINRA mediation
rules govern, among other issues, mediator selection, caucus formats, and
confidentiality protection.74 None of the rules for FINRA mediation resemble
the procedural requirements for arbitration. 75 Some people may question
mediation’s procedural sufficiency because, in general, lighter regulatory
schemes regularly lead to a lack of oversight. 76 However, for FINRA
mediation, such concerns are largely unfounded because FINRA ADR
procedures are monitored and administered by two controlling departments:
the FINRA Office of Dispute Resolution, and the FINRA National
Arbitration and Mediation Committee.77 These committees oversee FINRA
arbitration and mediation and also have the power to intervene in individual
cases should the need to protect one or both parties arise.78 FINRA oversight

73

Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 245 n.2 (1987).
See 14000. Code of Mediation Procedure, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://
finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=5373&element_id=42
93&highlight=14000#r5373 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
75
See 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra note 47;
13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note 47; 14000. Code of
Mediation Procedure, supra note 74.
76
Shahla F. Ali & Antonio Da Roza, Alternative Dispute Resolution Design in Financial
Markets—Some More Equal Than Others: Hong Kong’s Proposed Financial Dispute
Resolution Center in the Context of the Experience in the United Kingdom, United States,
Australia, and Singapore, 21 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 485, 515–16 (2012) (exploring the
differences between strong statutory regimes and the issues that arise with less stringent
statutory schemes).
77
14000. Code of Mediation Procedure, supra note 74.
78
12102. National Arbitration and Mediation Committee, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY
AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16704
&element_id=4101&highlight=12102#r16704 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12103. Director
of the Office of Dispute Resolution, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.
complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16705&element_id=4102&
highlight=12103#r16705 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13102. National Arbitration and
Mediation Committee, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en
/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16709&element_id=4198&highlight=13102#
r16709 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13103. Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution, FIN.
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403
&record_id=16710&element_id=4199&highlight=13103#r16710 (last visited Mar. 4,
2017); 14102. National Arbitration and Mediation Committee, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY
AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16716
&element_id =4296&highlight=14102#r16716 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 14103. Director
of the Office of Dispute Resolution, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11201&element_id=8139&
highlight=14103#r11201 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
74
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helps to ensure that the informal nature and systematic efficiency of
mediation do not harm its credibility.
E.

Problems with ADR in Securities Law Disputes

At first glance, the options for ADR in resolving security law disputes
do not pose any apparent problems. The FINRA mediation and arbitration
processes work commendably. These methods have passed the test of time
and are protected by concrete procedural rules that organize and monitor the
conduct of the parties. But sometimes neither mediation nor arbitration is a
perfect solution for resolving a dispute. Accordingly, the FINRA ADR
regime currently suffers from several problems.
First, FINRA mediation is underutilized: it is often overlooked as an
option in situations where an efficient compromise between the parties might
be possible. In 2015, among the 3,489 cases resolved under FINRA’s ADR
regime, only 306 cases were settled through mediation.79 That number is not
an outlier, as the percentage of mediated cases has remained around eight to
ten percent since 2012. 80 This low rate of mediation is clearly abnormal
compared to other industries where mediation is on the rise. 81 This
discrepancy can partially be explained because pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are allowed in the securities industry—making arbitration less
complex than it is in other industries. However, the reduction in complexity
does not fully explain the securities industry’s overwhelming preference for
arbitration over mediation.82 This indicates that the securities industry may
be wasting resources on unnecessary litigation and arbitration when many
disputes could be settled more efficiently through mediation.
Additionally, the disparity of use between arbitration and mediation
may be straining the credibility of FINRA’s ADR regime. While eight to ten
percent of cases are settled through mediation, 50% of cases are resolved
79
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through direct settlement by the parties every year.83 Some people may see
this phenomenon as desirable, because it seems to indicate that the system is
adequately encouraging parties to settle. However, as discussed above, most
FINRA securities cases are a David and Goliath-like struggle between a lay
individual and a gigantic broker-dealer firm backed by multi-billion dollar
budgets for litigation and dispute resolution. Therefore, without the
supervision of a third-party, honest broker, the settlement process risks
unfairness. Mediation could help alleviate this problem, but FINRA
mediation has proved too unpopular to offer much help so far. Consequently,
in order to better protect smaller, weaker parties, FINRA must come up with
a way to either encourage more mediation or, better yet, create a new system
comparable with arbitration.
II. MED-ARB: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The Scheinman Institute on Conflict Resolution of Cornell University
added an interesting question to its survey measuring the ADR experiences
of executives of Fortune 1000 Corporations.84 The question asked whether
the executives had experienced a hybrid ADR method called mediationarbitration (Med-Arb). 85 Of the executives sampled, 51% answered the
question in the affirmative, thus confirming the growing influence of MedArb. 86 Increasing use of Med-Arb is not limited to the United States;
internationally, Med-Arb has been studied extensively. 87 Because of the
many problems associated with ADR discussed above, the time has come for
FINRA to consider Med-Arb. To understand the value of Med-Arb in the
ADR context, it is first necessary to provide some basic background
information on the history and structure of this new tool for resolving
disputes.
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What is Med-Arb?

Med-Arb is a form of ADR that combines features of mediation and
arbitration.88 The method is a two-stage process: in the first stage, the parties
try to settle the case using standard mediation procedures.89 If issues remain
unresolved after mediation, parties immediately move on to the second stage:
arbitration, in which the remaining unresolved issues are finalized with
binding decisions. 90 This combination provides unprecedented procedural
efficiency by providing the flexibility of mediation and the finality of
arbitration in a single package.91
The use of Med-Arb in the U.S. was first seen in labor law disputes.92
Sam and John Kagel coined the term “Med-Arb” and first used it to settle a
San Francisco nurses’ strike in 1970.93 Since then, Med-Arb has been used to
resolve various types of industrial and commercial disputes, including
employment disputes, international disputes, and corporate disputes. 94
However, due to Med-Arb’s distinctive design (which some scholars view as
potentially problematic),95 its use has normally been limited to specific types
of disputes that can be carefully overseen by regulatory institutions.96
There are several variations of Med-Arb, which fall into two broad
97
types. First, there is the most general type, called Med-Arb-Same or SameNeutral Med-Arb. 98 In Med-Arb-Same, the same neutral decision-maker
serves as both mediator and arbitrator, so the phases continue without a
change in decision-maker.99 Due to differences in the confidentiality standard
between mediation and arbitration, some alternative types of Med-Arb
88
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attempt to regulate the power of the mediator-arbitrator. 100 For example,
sometimes the parties might opt-out of the second phase and pursue a separate
arbitrator. 101 The parties might also limit the range of possible outcomes
available to the arbitrator.102
The second type is Med-Arb-Diff, in which the two phases are
conducted with different neutral decision-makers. 103 This obligatory
restriction attempts to insulate the two stages more effectively than Med-ArbSame and prevent any legal issues of confidentiality between the stages.104
However, requiring this rigid segregation may harm the general advantage of
choosing the hybrid system since the process becomes less efficient. Like
Med-Arb-Same, Med-Arb-Diff can vary in its procedural details. For
example, parties might allow the mediator to write a recommendation to the
arbitrator of the second stage—allowing the mediator to deliver his
impressions and interpretations of the case.105 Parties might also expand the
mediator’s power by allowing him to attend the hearing stage of the
arbitration. 106 These variations, however, do not change the fundamental
principle that the mediator has no direct say on the binding decision in
arbitration.
While separating mediation and arbitration by using two different
neutral decision-makers may alleviate some of the innate disadvantages of
the Med-Arb-Same process (such as confidentiality and due process issues),
Med-Arb-Diff erodes the efficiency gains that Med-Arb is designed to
maximize. Med-Arb-Diff merely provides an additional ADR option that is
more expensive than either mediation or arbitration with a single neutral
decision-maker. Because the additional expense is not balanced against a
clear increase in efficiency, there is no point in spending time and money
focusing on such an alternative. Thus, Med-Arb-Same is the best solution to
the problems discussed above, as it requires only one neutral decision-maker
for the procedure and may finish at the mediation stage, costing no more than
a standard mediation. Therefore, the analysis that follows will only consider
the more efficient system, Med-Arb-Same.
100
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Advantages of Med-Arb

Med-Arb has many advantages. In order to assess how compatible
Med-Arb is with ADR in the securities law context, its costs and benefits
must be carefully weighed. The use of Med-Arb has three general benefits
over traditional mediation and arbitration processes. First, Med-Arb’s hybrid
format allows the parties to the dispute and the governing neutral decisionmaker to apply the beneficial elements of both mediation and arbitration
flexibly. 107 Arbitration alone does not allow the participants to assess
personal and external evidentiary impressions and intentions. When evidence
adequately resembles the factual circumstances of the dispute, such personal
mindsets and invisible intentions may not be relevant to the resolution of the
dispute. However, evidentiary circumstances are not always a true reflection
of reality. Giving arbitration an informal touch through sharing ex parte
conversations during mediation caucuses may provide the neutral decisionmaker with a better view of the real events. 108 Even though the neutral
decision-maker must delicately filter out confidential information that should
not be applied during arbitration, he will possess a better understanding of
the evidence brought to the arbitration stage. 109 This allows the neutral
decision-maker some flexibility in grappling with the factual circumstances
of the case.110 Parties will also benefit from flexibly incorporating the two
different stages, allowing them to better design their case presentations.111
Second, Med-Arb’s consolidated dispute resolution process should be
less expensive than holding arbitration and mediation separately. Under MedArb, the dispute might be resolved in either the mediation phase or the
arbitration phase. If all the issues are settled at the first stage, the procedural
costs of the suit will roughly equal the costs of resolving the case through
mediation because the parties only have to pay one decision-maker. Even if
the process moves to the second stage, the increase in procedural costs will
not be as great as if the parties had held a separate arbitration after the
mediation. 112 Through Med-Arb, parties will be able to proceed to the
arbitration process without incurring the additional expenses of hiring a new
107
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arbitrator and selecting a new date, time, and location for a separate
arbitration. This saves significant time because the neutral decision-maker
does not have to relearn the relevant factual and legal circumstances of the
case. 113 Moreover, FINRA will be able to reduce a sizable amount of
administrative expenses relating to arbitration. 114 When mediation use
increases at the expense of arbitration use, FINRA saves money because there
is no arbitration award to post and less meeting space is needed.115 The cost
reduction continues into the second phase as well because the arbitrator takes
less time, as the arbitrator is already familiar with the case.116
Finally, from the outset of Med-Arb, parties know that the process
will resolve the dispute.117 Thus, the mediation phase of Med-Arb functions
partially as a negotiation, guaranteeing either a settlement or a mandatory
arbitration. Such finality strengthens the mediation stage by incentivizing the
parties to settle at the earliest opportunity.118 Before moving on to arbitration,
the parties are aware that the dispute will be finalized one way or the other.119
Thus, settling disputes through mediation is more economical because
mediated settlements are often cheaper for the parties. This encourages the
participants to favor a faster, more economical conclusion to the dispute
through settlement at the mediation stage.
C.

Disadvantages of Med-Arb

The benefits of Med-Arb however are only one side of the story.
Scholars have expressed concerns that Med-Arb risks breaches of the
confidentiality of information shared in the mediation stage. 120 Because
parties engage with mediators during private caucus sessions, if the dispute
makes it to Med-Arb arbitration, the neutral decision-maker may have
already been exposed to more confidential information than the arbitrator
otherwise would have in a non-Med-Arb arbitration. 121 Some of the
information discussed in mediation may not be usable in the later rendering
113
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of an arbitration decision.122 And although the neutral decision-maker might
declare that she or he did not use the confidential information in rendering
her or his decision, it is not unreasonable to presume that such information
may have had an improper influence. Decisions rendered under the cloud of
such suspicion may harm the transparency of the mediation process in future
disputes because parties might not fully disclose certain information during
mediation. 123 If information is withheld, there is a risk that the parties’
interests in a fair resolution of the dispute will be fundamentally damaged.124
A second problem of Med-Arb is that it jeopardizes a party’s right to
due process in the arbitration phase.125 The confidential information obtained
in the mediation phase may harm the procedural structure of the arbitration
phase by damaging the discovery process and the impartiality of the neutral
decision-maker. The information revealed during the mediation caucuses
may prevent the neutral decision-maker from performing adequate analysis:
the prior information may cause the neutral decision-maker to interpret
evidence from a biased viewpoint.126 This bias could threaten the impartiality
of the final decision, potentially undermining a party’s right to due process.127
This may make parties less likely to proceed to the arbitration stage of MedArb, causing them to prematurely settle in mediation under a perceived state
of duress.128
Despite these minor flaws, Med-Arb remains a flexible and
inexpensive alternative to traditional arbitration: it offers the possibility of
finality, but may often result in a mediated settlement. These structural
features make Med-Arb an attractive ADR alternative that lies between
arbitration and mediation. In addition to the benefit of its efficiency gains,
Med-Arb also improves the structural operation of FINRA ADR.
III. IS MED-ARB THE ANSWER?
Because it is relatively untested in the context of securities dispute
resolution, this Article presents a careful analysis of Med-Arb’s policy and
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structure. In particular, this section will demonstrate that Med-Arb is a good
fit with FINRA. This section will also suggest additional safeguards that can
help alleviate the concerns some have with Med-Arb’s use in resolving
securities law disputes.
How Med-Arb Use Meets FINRA’s Needs and Standards

A.

Med-Arb is a good fit for resolving securities disputes under FINRA.
First, Med-Arb promotes the increased use of mediation. Parties who fail to
settle the case at the mediation stage move on to arbitration, where they are
subject to a final binding decision. Parties therefore have a greater incentive
to settle in mediation than they would under the traditional mediation-only
framework.129 The looming shadow of arbitration puts both psychological
and economic pressure on the parties, incentivizing them to reach a mediated
settlement on their own terms.130 This emphasis on the mediation stage will
therefore help promote the use of the FINRA mediation system. Were FINRA
to succeed in convincing parties to use Med-Arb, its structural features will
push a significant number of those cases to resolution through mediation.
Also, as more cases are settled in the mediation phase of Med-Arb, parties
will become familiar with the regular mediation process and might consider
using it more often in the future. Because of this familiarity, coupled with
FINRA’s mediation system (which is governed by detailed procedural
rules), 131 users will likely begin to use FINRA mediation in certain
circumstances instead of arbitration or Med-Arb.
Second, as a less expensive alternative to traditional arbitration, MedArb would compete with other forms of ADR within the FINRA ADR
market. The current dominance of FINRA arbitration is worrisome at best.132
A monopoly of one form of dispute resolution may cause overall structural
decay in FINRA’s ADR regime. For many lay investors and employees
confronting large broker–dealer firms, FINRA ADR may be a once-in-alifetime event; however, for the broker–dealer firms, FINRA ADR is a
routine part of doing business. These firms have a substantial advantage in
arbitration because of their abundant resources and cumulative experience. If
this is allowed to continue unchecked, it will be even more difficult for parties
129
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with fewer resources to be treated fairly in FINRA ADR. Therefore, the
viability of other forms of FINRA ADR, like Med-Arb, is critical to
improving the overall procedural fairness of the FINRA ADR regime—
competition may create a more level playing field that larger broker–dealer
firms are less likely to dominate so thoroughly.
Med-Arb is an excellent system for stimulating competition among
the different FINRA ADR options. Med-Arb is a viable alternative to FINRA
arbitration. Much of the preparatory work and documentation required for
both mediation and arbitration substantially overlaps in Med-Arb.
Incorporating arbitration into the second phase of Med-Arb does not
drastically increase the amount of preparation beyond that which is required
for mediation; hearing documents and evidentiary filings required by the
FINRA Discovery Guide are all that should be needed.133 Other than those
preliminary materials, there is no practical difference between the procedural
expenses of performing traditional mediation and the procedural expenses of
settling a case in the first stage of Med-Arb.
The procedural expenses for Med-Arb do increase if a complete
settlement is not reached in mediation. However, the increased cost is much
less than the cost of preparing and organizing a totally new and separate
arbitration. In Med-Arb, there is no additional cost required to hire new
arbitrators and set new schedules: all the parties must do is proceed to

133
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arbitration. Med-Arb is an accessible, economical, and practical alternative
to mediation and arbitration. Med-Arb can alleviate the current arbitration
monopoly and level the playing field amongst parties.
Finally, case law and FINRA’s administrative regulations can
adequately protect the confidentiality of the mediation phase and prevent
subsequent confidentiality and due process issues from arising in the
arbitration phase. Currently, the confidentiality of information exchanged
within the FINRA mediation process is highly protected under FINRA
Conduct Rules. 134 These provisions specifically prohibit parties and the
neutral decision-maker mediating the dispute from disclosing, introducing, or
using information disclosed during the mediation for any outside purpose
unless the parties agree in writing to such use.135 Some may argue that these
protections are insufficient because the neutral decision-maker performing
the mediation will invariably be exposed to confidential communications.
Once the information is heard—the argument goes—the disclosure of
confidential information (such as room for flexibility in the demands of the
parties, previously contemplated settlements, and weaknesses of claims) will
inevitably influence the thought process of the neutral decision-maker and
thus compromise the enforceability of the arbitration award. 136 However,
FINRA provisions allow these confidentiality protections to be waived with
the written consent of the parties. 137 Thus, parties could prevent
confidentiality conflicts by signing consent forms as a part of the Med-Arb
process.
However, if parties to Med-Arb pre-dispute agreements could
conduct Med-Arb under FINRA’s regulatory umbrella—as parties to predispute arbitration agreements can—then consent forms might not even be
necessary.138 FINRA interprets Shearson/American Express to hold that the
only ADR method enforceable under pre-dispute contracts is arbitration per
se.139 However, Shearson/American Express leaves open the possibility that
134
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other dispute resolution procedures might be covered by its holding in the
future.140 In addition, a number of court cases dispute the degree to which the
FAA encourages dispute resolution under the term “arbitration.” For
example, in Bakers Union Factory, #326 v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,141
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that what the federal government
purported to accomplish with the FAA was not requiring arbitration per se,
but rather enforcing any ADR method that the parties agreed to in order to
reach a conclusive resolution.142 In other words, some jurisdictions have held
that FAA enforcement is not limited to arbitration per se, and that it is
therefore reasonable to conclude that other forms of ADR, such as mediation
or Med-Arb, also meet the Shearson/American Express standard.143
However, FINRA is yet to acquiesce to this more open-minded
interpretation, instead only allowing for arbitration per se; FINRA requires
both parties to file voluntarily signed written agreements when they want to
use FINRA mediation.144 This may indicate that FINRA would likely require
parties pursuing Med-Arb to provide similar voluntary consent forms.
Therefore, requiring the parties to agree to consent forms permitting the
partial release of information exchanged in mediation may require nothing
more than adding a sentence or two to the existing voluntary participation
agreement. Moreover, FINRA’s conservative tendencies suggest that FINRA
is capable of implementing regulations to prevent subsequent confidentiality
issues in Med-Arb.
Courts will likely be loath to enforce awards when confidentiality is
violated in the mediation phase of Med-Arb. Because it is still relatively new
and uncommon, judicial precedents regarding Med-Arb are rarely found.
However, in Bowden v. Weickert,145 the Ohio Court of Appeals vacated an
arbitration award because the neutral decision-maker used information
introduced in the first phase of Med-Arb to reach the decision in the second
140
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phase.146 In other words, for those situations in which confidentiality is not
adequately protected by FINRA’s conservative legal provisions, courts are
likely to provide a second layer of confidentiality protection. 147 As it
currently stands, FINRA allows parties to vacate arbitration awards through
procedural rules.148
B.

Suggested Design for FINRA Med-Arb: Hodges Test

FINRA’s governing rules should provide a proper framework for
Med-Arb in securities dispute resolution. FINRA is ideally positioned to
mitigate the negative effects of combining mediation and arbitration because
it sets high ethical standards that limit the type of voluntary agreements
available to the parties.
A recent Louisiana court decision provides one example of how best
to frame such voluntary agreements. The Louisiana Supreme Court devised
an innovative framework for deciding whether arbitration agreements can be
used in attorney–client malpractice disputes. 149 The applicability of
arbitration agreements to malpractice disputes is a subject of national-level
legal debates primarily because arbitration creates a potential conflict with
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. ABA Model Rule 1.8(h) states:
A lawyer shall not:
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s
liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is
independently represented in making the agreement; or
(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an
unrepresented client or former client unless that person is
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel in connection therewith.150
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Signing an arbitration agreement could be deemed a settlement of a future
malpractice claim, which would require the client to receive advice in writing
and proper notice to seek independent counsel. Thus, consent to arbitration
might be viewed as a limitation on the client’s right to the many procedural
protections of a trial such as the right to appeal and the opportunity to
discover evidence under state or federal rules.151
In order to determine whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable,
the Louisiana Supreme Court created a seven-element test.152 The arbitration
agreement must (1) provide that the client waives the right to a trial, (2)
require the client to waive the right to an appeal, (3) state that the client
waives the right to broad discovery under federal and state procedural rules,
(4) inform the client that arbitration might involve substantial upfront costs
compared to litigation, (5) explicitly mention that it covers malpractice
claims, (6) not impinge upon the client’s right to make a disciplinary
complaint to the proper authorities, and (7) advise the client to seek
independent counsel before signing the agreement. 153 The court held that
when the agreement meets all seven requirements, it should be deemed
enforceable because it complies with the ABA Model Rules.154
The holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court provides an example of
how FINRA might design a similar rule for Med-Arb that could help shield
it from potential legal challenges. FINRA could draft specific qualifications
applying conservative standards that require the client to make an informed
decision about which rights they might be waiving by participating in MedArb. The FINRA requirements may be less burdensome than those of the
Hodges standard, as securities disputes are already subject to arbitration. The
test, therefore, might merely oblige the parties to acknowledge the
confidentiality issues inherent in the first phase, while also encouraging the
parties to seek independent counsel before signing. Med-Arb’s cost-effective
features will make it sufficiently attractive to prospective users, even after
meeting these seemingly burdensome requirements. Because Med-Arb is
different than arbitration per se, voluntary consent forms will likely be
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mandatory—the requirement boils down to nothing more than adding
additional language to the existing consent form.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FINRA application of Med-Arb suggested in this Article may
need to be adapted over time. As discussed above, Med-Arb is a relatively
new and uncommon form of ADR. For formalists who believe in the
distinctive functions of mediation and arbitration, the idea of combining the
two procedures may seem an outrageous suggestion—one that would damage
the procedural integrity of both systems. However, for FINRA, the benefits
of Med-Arb outweigh its potential costs. In fact, Med-Arb may provide the
key to mitigating some of the negative effects resulting from arbitration’s
current dominance in securities dispute resolution. Because Med-Arb leads
to increased use of mediation, it will make the FINRA ADR regime more
efficient, thus strengthening it. Although Med-Arb runs the risk of
compromising confidentiality during mediation, FINRA has ample tools at
its disposal to minimize the negative effects of this problem without
significantly eroding Med-Arb’s many benefits. The adoption of Med-Arb in
securities dispute resolution may not only effectively solve some of FINRA
ADR’s structural problems, but might also plant seeds that lead to the
development of other ADR methods that will further improve securities
dispute resolution in the future.

